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Who Am I?

MULTIPLE CHOICE

     1.   Philosophers distinguish the concept of a “person” from the concept of a “human being,” because

a.
philosophy requires that all terms have specific and distinguishable definitions.
b.
we know that fetuses are humans but are not persons.
c.
“person” is not a biological concept.
d.
not all human beings are persons.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 559

     2.   The problem with saying “I am the same person today, at 25 years old, as I was when I was only 5 years old,” is that

a.
a 25 year old adult doesn’t have the same characteristics as a 5 year old child.
b.
5 year old children don’t really have personalities yet.
c.
we don’t know the meaning of the word “same.”
d.
even though persons remain the same over time, others cannot verify this “sameness.”

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 560

     3.   Which of the following is a reason that people value the concept of the soul?

a.
The soul changes as our identity changes.
b.
The soul is our bundle of thoughts, memories and experiences.
c.
Each soul is identical and gives people a common human nature.
d.
The soul assures us of a life after death.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 560

     4.   Social identity is closely tied to gender identity because

a.
we are all social animals.
b.
we are free to choose both for ourselves.
c.
our gender affects our social relations.
d.
social identity is reducible to gender identity.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 560

     5.   The Buddhist doctrine of anatta means

a.
impermanence.
b.
five aggregates.
c.
no-self.
d.
Atman.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 561

     6.   The mind-body problem in Buddhism is

a.
a problem about how two totally different substances interact.
b.
a problem about how a variety of differing processes can causally affect each other.
c.
not a problem at all.
d.
solved by their theory that Atman exists as the center of consciousness.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 561

     7.   According to Buddhism, the five aggregates are

a.
physical form, sensations, thoughts, desires, and a soul.
b.
physical form, thirst, hunger, desire, and greed.
c.
physical form, sensations, conceptualizations, dispositions to act, and consciousness.
d.
physical form, sensations, conceptualizations, dispositions, but no consciousness since there is no soul.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 561

     8.   King Menander argues against Nagasena’s claim that the name Nagasena is only a practical designation by trying to show that

a.
Nagasena is no better than a chariot.
b.
“chariot” refers only to the axle, wheel, and yoke, not to the frame and spokes.
c.
the Atman exists.
d.
Nagasena’s claim leads to the absurdity that he does not exist.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 562

     9.   The argument between King Menander and Nagasena is intended to show that

a.
if our names do not refer to permanent individuals existing above and beyond the parts that make us up, we cannot exist.
b.
even if our names do not refer to a permanent individual existing above and beyond the parts that make us up, we can exist.
c.
the soul is the essence of the person.
d.
sentience is a property of the soul.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 562

   10.   According to Center theories of the self, the self is

a.
the center of consciousness and identical with thoughts and feelings.
b.
the center of consciousness, but not identical with thoughts, feelings, or sensations.
c.
a collection of thoughts, feelings, and sensations.
d.
a bundle of no- things.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 563

   11.   In the split-brain cases studied by researchers in the 1960s, psychologists discovered that

a.
brains could be split in two without substantially affecting consciousness.
b.
when brains are split in two, subjects report a sensitivity to perceptual stimuli that they were not previously aware of.
c.
Buddhists could split their states of awareness into two or more distinct streams of consciousness.
d.
people behaved as if they were experiencing two separate states of awareness.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 565

   12.   According to the Ego theory of persons,

a.
personal identity is a function of the continued existence of a particular ego.
b.
the ego, as the subject of experiences, grows more comprehensive with each new experience.
c.
those with stronger egos are more likely to survive than those without strong egos.
d.
a person’s ego exists as long as that person’s consciousness exists.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 567

   13.   According to the Bundle theory of self,

a.
each person is a bundle of many selves.
b.
the self is all those elements of a person’s life that have been consistent enough to “bundle” into a coherent whole.
c.
the unity of experience is founded on causal relations between different mental states and events.
d.
there is no real unity of experience.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 567

   14.   Parfit argues that the imaginary case of teletransportation prompts us to wonder whether we would still be ourselves after being teletransported into a replica of ourselves, because

a.
it is clear that a replica is only like, but not identical to, our original selves.
b.
it is a truth of language that a replica of anything is not the same as the original thing.
c.
there is no way that a “blueprint” of anyone’s self could be perfect.
d.
we have a false understanding of what persons are.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 568

   15.   Imagine that you are in the process of becoming a replica of yourself through teletransportation. According to Parfit, it would be impossible to identify the moment in this process at which you ceased being you and began being your replica, because

a.
you would cease to exist before you could do so.
b.
the replica would believe that he or she was you, making it impossible to determine the crucial moment of change.
c.
either you will survive, or you are about to die.
d.
science has not yet developed the equipment that could measure such changes.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 569

   16.   According to Parfit, the question of whether you would still be you if you were to change into an exact replica of yourself is an empty question because

a.
unlike scientific questions, this philosophical question doesn’t have an exact answer.
b.
split-brain research has already shown that you would, indeed, be another person.
c.
in reality, there is only one course of events, not two distinct possibilities from which to choose.
d.
the situation that prompted the question in the first place is an imaginary one.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 569

   17.   One reason that the Bundle theory of self is difficult to accept, according to Parfit, is that

a.
it undermines the hope that we might continue to exist in the future as the very same persons that we are now.
b.
the theory of anatta (the Buddhist theory of “no self”) is an illogical theory.
c.
it cannot explain why the unity of experience splinters in split-brain cases.
d.
there is little scientific support for such a theory.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 569

   18.   Parfit compares the case (caused by the split-brain phenomenon) of having two different perceptual experiences to being aware (at one and the same time) of auditory and visual experiences. He does so, because he wants to show that

a.
there are two subjects of experience.
b.
even quite ordinary experiences are incoherent and inexplicable.
c.
the capacity to have multiple experiences is as unusual as are split-brain cases.
d.
being aware of several different kinds of experiences at once is actually quite normal.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 571

   19.   Parfit argues that ceasing to exist is as good – and as bad – as ordinary survival. He bases this claim on the idea that

a.
there is no unique self-substance, so there is no self to lose in dying or keep in living.
b.
the true self can never cease to exist, so the afterlife is not essentially different from this life.
c.
a life of mere survival includes many struggles and difficulties.
d.
death is actually good.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 571

   20.   After Dennett’s first operation, when his radio-controlled body contemplated his brain in the vat, he was surprised that he assumed he was outside the vat, because

a.
he knew his brain was inside the vat.
b.
he had always thought that his awareness occurred in his brain.
c.
his eyes could see his brain was in the vat.
d.
his brain could see that his body was not in the vat.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 573

   21.   Dennett quickly rejected the thought that he was in his body and not in his brain, because

a.
his brain had such trouble imaging itself into his body.
b.
he understands that brains without bodies can live, but bodies without brains cannot live.
c.
it seemed clear that his point of view was from the vat.
d.
it seemed clear that his body, with another brain, would not be Dennett himself.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 574

   22.   When Dennett imagines what would happen if his Yorick-controlled body robbed a bank in California, it convinces him that

a.
he would rather be in his free body, than in an incarcerated Yorick.
b.
he could only have planned a robbery if he was really in Yorick and not his body.
c.
he could probably pull off the robbery with no consequences whatsoever.
d.
legal rather than philosophical considerations will help him determine where he is — in his body, or in Yorick.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 575

   23.   At one point, Dennett speculates that it is plausible to say, “I am wherever I think I am,” because

a.
it seems reasonable to assume that he is where he appears to be, based on his point of view on reality.
b.
it is impossible to believe you are anywhere other than where your point of view tells you that you are.
c.
if he were in jail, he would rather think he was out of jail.
d.
the story has so confused the issue that this is as good an answer as any other to the question, “Where am I?”

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 575

   24.   When the radio links between his brain and his body are broken, Dennett believes that he may have discovered he is a soul, because

a.
the broken link caused an “out of body” experience, in which he saw his lifeless body in the tunnel.
b.
he could feel himself traveling between his body and his brain without any physical support.
c.
he moved wholly and instantly from his body to his brain.
d.
his physical feelings were faint and remote.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 577

   25.   In this story, Dennett is not disturbed by awakening in a new body, because

a.
he knows that science (in this story) is sufficiently advanced to be able to make the switch without mishap.
b.
he thinks having a new body is just like undergoing extensive plastic surgery, which people do all the time.
c.
he knows he will have the same brain in this new body.
d.
his experience tells him that having a new body does not change him into a new person.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 578

   26.   The suspicion that Dennett considers the brain rather than the body as the essential “place” of personhood, is supported in his story by

a.
his multiple references to the brain as the story progresses.
b.
his description of a “point of view.”
c.
the emergence of a new “I” when Dennett’s two brains drift “out of sync.”
d.
the way he mentions, and then never returns to, the idea of a soul.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 580

   27.   According to Anzaldúa, Chicano Spanish developed because

a.
Chicanos did not enjoy speaking formal Spanish in their new land.
b.
of the way formal Spanish applies derogatory words to women, but not men.
c.
Chicanos needed a way to express their distinct identity.
d.
Chicanos experienced themselves as Spaniards rejected by the dominant Anglo culture.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 579

   28.   Anzaldúa lists the various languages that she speaks in order to highlight

a.
that she is smarter than her readers.
b.
that language is slippery and betrays identity.
c.
that language shapes identity, and one’s language and identity is shaped by context.
d.
that no one can understand anyone else.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 579

   29.   While many call Chicano Spanish an “incorrect language,” Anzaldúa argues that

a.
it is a living language reflective of the changing experiences of a people.
b.
it is a living language mirroring the natural movement in the Southwest away from Spanish and toward English.
c.
it is really formal Spanish and standard English which are “incorrect” languages.
d.
its “incorrectness” should be tolerated out of respect for the needs of the people who speak the language.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 579

   30.   Anzaldúa explains some features of Chicano Spanish by reference to

a.
a desire among Chicanos to move their language closer to the English of their adopted home.
b.
the linguistic isolation of Chicanos living in the Southwest.
c.
a conscious choice to develop words expressing the Chicano’s dissatisfaction with Anglo power.
d.
a lack of education.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 580

   31.   According to Anzaldúa, attacking a person’s language is attacking that person herself, because

a.
people care deeply about their languages, even though there is no real reason that they should do so.
b.
such attacks cause living languages, and therefore the people who speak them, to stop growing and changing.
c.
such attacks also attack a person’s ethnic identity.
d.
people want their language to hide their actual identity.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 581

   32.   One of the difficulties of belonging to a “border people” is

a.
being unable to understand the languages of those who do not live as border people.
b.
the way it can narrow the linguistic flexibility of those living “in” the border.
c.
having little clear sense of identity-creating images and emotions.
d.
the way internalized borderland conflicts can undermine any sense of identity.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 584

   33.   According to the essentialist theory of gender, a person’s gender is

a.
a social rather than biological part of their identity.
b.
a fixed and stable part of their identity.
c.
an idea invented by feminists.
d.
found in a person’s DNA.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 584-585

   34.   According to feminist theory, “biological determinism” is to “male,” as “social construction” is to

a.
“masculine.”
b.
“sexuality.”
c.
“female.”
d.
“feminism.”

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 585

   35.   The word “queer,” in Queer theory, primarily refers to

a.
the term gays and lesbians prefer to use when identifying themselves.
b.
any kind of sexuality with deviates from the norm.
c.
that which is odd or peculiar.
d.
persons who are biologically normal, but behaviorally deviant.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 585

   36.   When McCloskey says that crossing the boundary of gender is a strange thing, she is

a.
implying that those who have such desires see themselves as unlike any other group of people.
b.
suggesting that ultimately, the desire to cross gender boundaries is incomprehensible.
c.
acknowledging that gender change is unnatural.
d.
acknowledging that gender change is statistically unusual.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 586

   37.   An “inner migration” is

a.
a move from one life into another through personal transformation.
b.
the mark of a creative and flexible mind.
c.
an imaginary trip to another country.
d.
an exploration of “who one is.”

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 586

   38.   McCloskey compares crossing gender boundaries with traveling to a foreign country, because she

a.
realizes that foreign travel challenges our sense of personal identity as deeply as does gender-crossing.
b.
wants to show that anybody could benefit from gender crossing, just as they might benefit from foreign travel.
c.
considers gender crossing to be a form of travel through which one can return “home” to one’s original gender a more experienced and compassionate person.
d.
is trying to convey the idea that gender crossing is not significantly different from other unusual but socially accepted transformations.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 586

   39.   When McCloskey says that her gender crossing was not utilitarian, she means that

a.
she knew being “a guy” is more useful in society than being a woman, but she didn’t care.
b.
her desire to cross boundaries was motivated by simple human curiosity.
c.
she was not seeking to experience new kinds of pleasures.
d.
her decision wasn’t the result of pressure from family and friends.

ANS:  C                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 587

   40.   McCloskey apologizes for contrasting how men and women are, because

a.
she knows she has not yet been a woman long enough to fairly make such a comparison.
b.
she rejects the general idea that there are essential ways of being men and women.
c.
she fears that men will always look bad when compared to the goodness of women.
d.
she feels that no one should ever be contrasted with anyone else, because we are all free to be who we are.

ANS:  B                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 588

   41.   One reason that McCloskey is convinced that gender is not natural in every way, is

a.
her own experience with the daily realities of “being a woman.”
b.
her belief that we are who we are.
c.
her belief that there is no such thing as gender.
d.
her extensive studies, as a professor, of the psychology of human sexuality.

ANS:  A                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 588

   42.   One of the things that drew McCloskey to Christianity was

a.
the beauty of its sacred literature.
b.
the compassion all Christians show to those who are “different.”
c.
its non-medical approach to understanding gender crossers.
d.
the central role of forgiveness in the Christian worldview.

ANS:  D                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 588

TRUE/FALSE

     1.   According to Descartes, my identity as a soul-substance guarantees that I am always the same person despite changes I might undergo in appearance.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 560

     2.   The no-self teaching of Buddhism has no implications for living a life of compassion.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 561

     3.   According to Buddhism, the soul would be impermanent if it were sentient, but if it were not sentient it would not exist as a conscious, sensing entity.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 563

     4.   The Buddhist theory of the self is the same as the Center theory.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 563

     5.   The Atman theory of the self is the same as the Bundle theory.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 567

     6.   The Bundle theory is inconsistent when it asserts that we both are and are not persons.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 567

     7.   People who study personal identity consider questions such as, “What is continuous about my identity from the time that I am 5 years old to the time that I am 50 years old?”

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 571

     8.   If his spare brain were to be implanted into a duplicate body, Dennett is not too concerned about which brain-body he would be, because his intuition tells him he would exist as long as either one of the brain-bodies existed.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 580

     9.   Dennett believes that it is the body that supports who “I” am.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 580

   10.   Anzaldúa considers the question “How is language related to identity?”

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 579

   11.   “Linguistic terrorism” is using language to deny people their identity.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 581

   12.   Anzaldúa suggests that the Mexican identity of the Southwestern Chicanos is deeply rooted in a sense of national pride.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 581

   13.   Anzaldúa seems to fear that Chicanos, because of their uncertain and devalued identity, will ultimately disappear as a people.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  F                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 584

   14.   One of the major breakthroughs of feminist theory was to separate the social from the biological in such a way that what was formerly thought to be relatively unchangeable was recognized as changeable.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 585

   15.   Deirdre McCloskey likens crossing gender boundaries to crossing many other types of boundaries.

a. True

b. False

ANS:  T                    PTS:   1                    REF:   p. 586

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