Humanitarian Intervention Discussion

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Institution of Affiliation

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Humanitarian Intervention Discussion

Question 1

Kuperman’s article’s main research question is trying to identify whether potential third parties who intervene in a groups or subgroups’ intention could trigger a response in genocidal violence by trying to reduce the hazard by changing their intervention policies (Kuperman, 2008).

Question 2

One of the theories leading to this moral hazard is the promotion of irresponsibility among the groups in retaliation. This is caused by raising the expectations of the retaliating group who acquire arms to take on the state with the uncertainty of success but in the hopes of intervention from international communities. The other theory suggests fraudulent actions and risks taken by the retaliating groups. They use the presence of the moral hazard to achieve their political goals. The retaliating groups challenge the state sacrificing their civilians in the hopes of insurmountable retaliation from the government. The effect is the international intervention necessary to further their political agenda.

The author does explore rival explanations of this political phenomenon. According to the writer, there could be a misinterpretation of the humanitarians’ role by the observers. The writer claims that the humanitarians’ motivation to enact the so-called responsibility to protect lies solely in the interests of the humanitarian. The actual genocidal violence could see this about to take place or the humanitarian’s interest to take control of a state’s resources, eliminate a target, or play a strategic part in the economy of the State.

Question 3

The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo act in response to the effect of humanitarian intervention. The two cases were mitigated by the moral hazard being perceived in a wrongful situation. Thus, the writer explains that the Humanitarian intervention in both countries is responsible for the states’ retaliation leading to genocidal violence due to arms challenges. Internal validity of the concept in both cases up until international intervention is made an option for them. External validity shows an instance where the Albanians try to look for a solution to Croatia’s shortcomings.

Question 4

In this section, there is no expectation of pursuing a credible threat by the state for retaliation. According to Bosnia’s minority group, the Muslims understood the weight of the situation perceiving the threat and armed themselves to secede and expect retaliation from the Serbians. Kosovo perceived the same threat, and thus, the rebellion expected massive retaliation. The reader does not accept this hypothesis since the role of international intervention does not come into play anywhere in the events that took place in both cases.

For the writer’s second hypothesis, there was an expectation of victimization to take place away, and the groups had nothing to lose. Mostly, in this case, the worst was expected to take place in both cases. They believed that other options that they would pursue would grant them the victory that they so much desired. Both instances opted for non-violent Confrontation to preserve their lives rather than not to lose. Even though in Bosnia, there was an interference by the EC’s Proposal in sorting out Bosnia’s matters before the year of the deliberated consensus.

The third hypothesis shows an expectation of victory with tolerable low-cost without intervention. Both cases had rebellious groups of the lowest minorities. These minority groups were very weak and did not have the required resources to take on a state. Both affected minorities in Bosnia and the Albanians had minimal resources in terms of army supply and minimum military human resource, leaving them vulnerable to a major loss if they decided to take on their powerful parties. Given the circumstances of both countries, the situation made them helpless, having a minority group as the rebellion with no resources for that matter. The two instances had no chance of victory with no intervention for international communities. At this stage, the moral hazard is most pronounced as it leaves the Citizens being affected hopeless unless the responsibility to protect is enacted.

This hypothesis will let groups expect victory at tolerably low cost with intervention. With this in mind, the Muslim leaders in Bosnia launched a strategy to attain international support. Although this method will prove to work well for them and provide them with a victory they so desired, it almost backfired. It required much planning and reduced expectations in achieving the necessary international intervention as soon as possible. Rebels of Albania attempted to gain international support by provoking the star beyond retaliation. All in all, it only came at a cost as they realized with more deaths of civilians that international intervention became more profound.

Commonly known as the null hypothesis, it predicts that no behavior at this point is rational towards unitary actions. This hypothesis is proven in post-war, where some of the leaders and studies show much preparation was required before taking on the Serbs. Furthermore, the Albanians, on the other hand, acted irrationally on the idea of international intervention. Although at times, rational judgment was made to prevent violence. They also banked on international help during the rebellion, and the behavior was based on preventing violence when they had no chance against the Belgrade’s. This hypothesis brings out irrationality based on the hope that international help would be available to both minority rebel groups anytime. They had a long-term goal through which they led to a tolerable low-cost than expected, and victory was achieved in the long run.

Question 5

Conclusively, the researcher meets the goals of his study. He describes the causality of the endeavor he set out to discuss and addresses the research question of the study. Mostly he addresses specific issues as discussed in the study providing recommendations for each problem. On the other hand, the study over-reaches the solutions providing general predictability, which would not necessarily work for specific situations. Mainly because some of the data collected are based on a present situation of interference with National matters that do not necessarily concern the international bodies, this leaves a vulnerability in the state decisions or, as discussed earlier, in misinterpretation of international motives.

Reference

Kuperman, A. J. (2008). The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: Lessons from the Balkans. International Studies Quarterly, 52(1), 49–80.